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At this point, I do not think further discussion in this thread will be productive.

From a technical perspective, the core issues described earlier were explained and resolved to the extent possible based on the information provided. The remaining problems clearly require a systematic, local troubleshooting approach (interface isolation, DHCP logs, packet captures), not a forum discussion about general perception, branding, or community culture.

This forum is a community-driven space. Participation is voluntary, and responses reflect individual experience and time availability, not official positions of Deciso or OPNsense. Expectations beyond that inevitably lead to frustration on all sides.

I wish you success in resolving your setup and in finding a solution that fits your requirements. I will step back from this thread now.

Actually, that was not a "little" bug. But did that rule come out of the blue or was it present before?

Because you obviously have used the migration assistant, you should be able to look at the rules before the migration.

This would be helpful to tell if there is a potential "HUGE" bug or just a misconfiguration on your part.

[including the reflection settings]

Because it does not work for interfaces that are created on-the-fly or change their IPs if the BIND is not done to the anonymous socket 0.0.0.0, which denotes "all" interfaces, including such that do not exist (yet).

Just try to use a VPN interface: It will seem to work, but on the next reboot, the service fails because it cannot bind to a non-existing interface.

So, the usual way is to bind services to "all" interfaces and block access using firewall rules.

However:

I still do not understand how this could happen unless there is some other misplaced rule or - even more likely - the smartphone was connected via WiFi and that causes a false positive test.

As I said, I use the same settings including the reflection settings and see no such thing.

+1

This "fix" should really be undone with the next release.


BTW: How do I roll that package back? "opnsense-revert -r 25.7.11 os-nextcloud-backup" fails with:

Code Select Expand

Fetching os-nextcloud-backup.pkg: ..[fetch: https://pkg.opnsense.org/FreeBSD:14:amd64/26.1/MINT/25.7.9/latest/Latest/os-nextcloud-backup.pkg.sig: Not Found] failed


I have the Anti-Lockout rules enabled and administration on all interfaces, too. During 26.1 upgrade, two separate non-editable rules have shown up on top of the destination NAT rules, for IPv4 and IPv6. The source interface for both is LAN.

I have done no rules migration to new rules and also created no new rules. Reflection settings are all on in "Firewall: Settings: Advanced".

SSH and Web GUI are not open on WAN.

How would that work? The anti-lockout rules are for the LAN interface as source only. Did you actually see those two ports open from the WAN side?

That is a fundamental question, but note: I never promoted to do that. Actually, I would do it only for good reasons, which do exist.

If you assume a Linux driver issue that can be exploited on the PVE host, OpnSense will not protect you. You can impede that somewhat by using passthru, where OpnSense itself drives the hardware, which could be useful for the WAN NIC. On the other hand that will undermine purposes such as Linux drivers often being more stable than FreeBSD ones, like for Realtek cards, where you would want to use virtio.

However, usually, you will have to reach the NIC via IP first and PVE does not have control over the network layer, such that your attacks must be crafted to reach the IP, but attack lower layers. Otherwise, the packets will not even get through to your system.

Most attacks aim at higher layers these days and you could argue that there are many more lower layer attacks which you cannot prevent. Think of Intel I226-LM adapters which allow for remote administration OUTSIDE anything your "machine" does by virtue of Intel vPro/AMT.

Note that the PVE interface itself is hidden "behind" OpnSense, on the logical LAN interface, which usually exists on a (virtual) bridge and is often reachable only from VMs behind OpnSense or internal clients. In the case of a cloud-hosted instance, you will probably allow access only through a VPN configured in OpnSense - at least I do it like that.

That way, the outside attack surface is small - and also, since OpnSense and all other instances are VMs in this case, I can always roll back to snapshots or backups.

Remember: there is no 100% security - this will always be a tradeoff.

My problem seems unrelated as of now, probably just a glitch. At least it never turned up again.

Siehe https://forum.opnsense.org/index.php?topic=42985.0, Punkt 3.

Yes, I can shift order within multiple groups.

But what happens with rules that once where in the floating rules that apply to only one interface during migration?

AFAIU, they will become an interface rules by virtue of them having only one interface. So, say I have an "Allow all but RFC1918" rule in a restricted group rule. If a floating block rule for, say, QFeeds was in the old rules only for one LAN interface to keep clients to connect to malware sites, it would get demoted to an interface rule and overridden by the group rule allowing essentially all internet traffic.

With the group rules residing "between" floating and interface rules, the "only one interface switch" effectively causes an implicit shift of two priority levels, or am I incorrect?

That would mean I have to place block rules somewhere else (at least if they apply to one interface only). I know that does not affect you, Patrick, since you block only on WAN inbound.


P.S.: I just tested that and found that floating rules that apply to one group only get shifted to the group section...

I see. Jumping to conclusions on my side, because I often did that via two rules, one blocking access to "internal net" and one allowing everyting else.
This was easier because you can then use a more concise rule description. But with only one "allow" rule, it works. One must remember to only use allow in the group rules.

I found a problem with how the new rules scheme will be handled with Patrick's approach:

Imagine a typical "Allow any to !RFC1918" rule for any non-privileged VLAN. Actually, it would be better to have "!internal net" instead, which applies to both IPv4 and IPv6, BTW.

In Patrick's and my scheme, you would be tempted to move that to the end of the restricted group rule instead of at the end of each individual interface rules - as is shown in Patricks ruleset above.

However, when you want to make any exception to that general rule, e.g. if you have a monitoring client in one of your restricted networks, you would simply place them before that last interface rule. Since the group rules are prioritized higher, you would have to move such individual rules to the floating section to preceed the group rules if you were to have a general group rule.

As a side note, this has the disadvantage of forcing most of the specific rules to the floating section, although they apply only to one VLAN, which makes things less transparent, but it still works.

However, this scheme breaks once you do the migration to the new rules: Any such specific floating rule that applies to only one interface will move to the interface section, where it now does not preceed the group rules any more and thus does not work.

Therefore, it would still be better to leave the "general" rule in the individual interface rules: It makes things clearer and survives a rule migration.


Somehow I had a hunch that this "one interface only" switch in the new rules scheme would cause problems., because it mixes up the priorities.

[keine]

Ihr wisst schon: "Geht nicht" ist keine valide Fehlerbeschreibung. Zum einen scheint Kea betroffen. Startet der? Wenn nicht: Welche Fehlermeldung erscheint? Wie sieht die dazu führende Konfiguration aus?

Am Rande: Ich nutze auch Kea und bei mir geht es. Das ist eine valide Beschreibung - ich erwarte ja auch keine Problemlösung.

*phew* What a rabbit hole :-)

I wonder what percentage of people can still follow what we are talking about here... ;-)

Yet, I had only the typical "Block RESTRICTED to local networks" and "Allow any to internet" rules in the RESTRICTED group, which I switched out for explicit interface rules at some point. Unless you have a large number of VLANs, it seemed more explicit that way to me.

Made me laugh, Patrick, because I have exactly the same distinction between "internal" and "restricted" (this one even with the same name).

As for your question: Look under Firewall: Groups, the interface group have an assigned "sequence" which I believe to determine the order.